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Religious Symbols and the 
Establishment Clause 
NEAL DEVINS 
On 5 March 1984, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
(five to four) as constitutional the city of Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island's Christmas display of the nativity scene. This decision, 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 1 once again, points to the inherent problems 
of the government's attempting to recognize America's religious 
heritage without infringing on the Bill of Rights' mandate that 
church and state remain separate. 
Lynch raises a number of questions concerning the manner in 
which the government may constitutionally involve itself with 
the display of explicitly religious objects: Can it subsidize the 
display of such objects? Does it matter whether the object is part 
of some larger "secular" display? Should the prominence of the 
display or the proximity of the display to some religious holiday 
be considered legally relevant? Must the government indicate on 
the display that its motivation is nonreligious? Must the religious 
object be sufficiently connected to the "secular" culture as to 
make meaningless the display's religious significance? 
These questions are of constitutional significance because the 
First Amendment of the Constitution provides, in part, that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion." This prohibition was made applicable to the actions of 
state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
1940 Supreme Court decision, Cantwell v. Connecticut. 2 
Courts vary in their analysis of government efforts either to 
accommodate or to recognize specific religious beliefs. Although 
much of religion-particularly the Christmas holidays and reli-
gious symbols such as the dove-has become part of mainstream 
"secular" society, government efforts to make religious symbols 
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1. Lynch v. Donnelly, I 04 S.Ct. 1355 (1984). 
2. Cantwe//v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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more visible raises troublesome issues under the Establishment 
Clause. Clearly, the state cannot advance one type of religious 
belief to the disadvantage of other beliefs. The display of reli-
gious symbols cannot be couched in neutral terms as can aid to 
(overwhelmingly religious and predominantly Catholic) private 
schools. At the same time, it is not inconceivable that a religious 
symbol may have an intrinsic secular meaning. For example, a 
Christmas tree and Santa Claus are commonly associated with a 
time of year and not a set of religious beliefs. 
What, however, should be done with a publicly funded display 
of outwardly religious symbols such as the nativity scene or the 
cross? A display of such objects can be viewed as impermissible 
governmental approval of a particular type of religious belief. 
Such public displays, however, are frequently thought of as being 
cultural symbols and not statements of religious belief. How 
then should a court resolve a constitutional challenge to a pub-
licly funded display of an outwardly religious symbol? 
On the one hand, society should not become so secularized as 
to exclude any reference to this country's religious heritage. On 
the other hand, government monies used to advance one particu-
lar kind of religious belief might be the principal evil that the 
Establishment Clause sought to forestall. 
Case law on the religious symbol issue is quite inconclusive 
and frequently at odds with itself. Aside from the nativity scene 
controversy, this issue has generally arisen in four contexts-
namely, postings of the Ten Commandments, displays of the 
cross, celebration of religious events, and some recognition of 
religious heritage such as appeals to God printed on items made 
available to the public through the government. The results in 
this group of cases are quite mixed and, thus, pointed to the 
need for the Supreme Court to resolve the religious symbols 
ISSUe. 
Lynch v. Donnelly, however, evidenced an insensitivity on the 
part of the justices to minority non-Christian views about reli-
gious symbols such as the nativity scene. In Lynch, the Court 
virtually ignored the pervasively religious message conveyed by 
the nativity scene. Instead of balancing the creche's traditional 
or historical value against its religious value, the Court simply 
characterized the nativity scene as a secular display. Such char-
acterization ignores both the significant religious value of the 
creche to Christians and the plain fact that the Pawtucket dis-
play might have the effect of alienating non-Christians. Addi-
tionally, the Lynch majority failed to explicate in a principled 
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manner the standards of judicial review to be utilized in Estab-
lishment Clause cases. 
THE EsTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The standard of review most commonly utilized in Establish-
ment Clause decisions is the so-called tripartite test. This test 
provides that for a legislative enactment to pass constitutional 
muster, the statute "must have a secular legislative purpose," 
"its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion," and, finally, "the statute must not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion."3 If 
any one of these three elements is not satisfied, the statute will 
be found unconstitutional. 
Although easily stated, the application of this three-pronged 
test has been mystifying. The Court itself noted that "in many 
of these decisions we have expressly or implicitly acknowledged 
that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this 
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutionallaw."4 In a similar 
vein, the Court has recognized the limited precedential value of 
its Establishment Clause decisions: "Establishment clause cases 
are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among 
ourselves .... What is certain is that our decisions have tended 
to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches to 
either end of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacri-
fices clarity and predictability for flexibility."S Consequently, al-
though the tripartite test "is well settled, our cases have also 
emphasized that it provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' 
in dealing with establishment clause challenges."6 Recent Estab-
lishment Clause decisions suggest that the tripartite test has itself 
become "unhelpful. "7 
In its 1983 Marsh v. Chambers8 decision, for example, the 
Supreme Court devised a historical exemption to the tripartite 
test. Marsh upheld the state of Nebraska's practice of beginning 
each session of its state legislature with a prayer by a chaplain 
paid and approved by the state legislature. In upholding this 
practice, the Court declined, without explanation, to apply the 
3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
4. Ibid. 
5. Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,662 (1980). 
6. Huntv. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,741 (1973). 
7. See, e.g., Neal Devins, "Inconsistent Standards of Review in Last Term's Establishment 
Cases," National Law Journal 3 (October 1983):22. 
8. Mar.sh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 {1983). 
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tripartite test. 9 Instead, the Court based its decision solely upon 
the fact that the first Congress had a paid legislative chaplain. 
The Court felt that the first Congress would have been acutely 
aware of the meaning of the Establishment Clause since they 
crafted it. Had the Court applied contemporary Establishment 
Clause standards, however, they undoubtedly would have found 
the legislative chaplain unconstitutional. As 1 ustice William 1. 
Brennan, 1 r. noted in his powerful dissent: "That the 1purpose' 
of the legislative prayer is preeminently religious rather than 
secular seems to me to be self-evident .... I have no doubt that, 
if any group of law students were asked to apply the tripartite 
test, to legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find 
the practice to be unconstitutional."lO 
Marsh was the first Establishment Clause decision to make 
explicit use of the historical exemption.ll The notion, however, 
that religious practices deeply embedded in this history/tradition 
are beyond the purview of judicial review would appear to apply 
to several other situations. Examples of this range from the "In 
God We Trust" motto printed on U.S. currency to the singing 
of Christmas carols in public schools to possibly publicly funded 
displays of the nativity scene.12 
A second exception to the tripartite standard was carved out 
by the Supreme Court in their 1982 decision, Larson v. Valente. 13 
Larson invalidated a Minnesota statute that exempted religious 
organizations from Charitable Solicitations Act requirements pro-
vided that more than half of their total contributions derive from 
church members or affiliated organizations. Apparently, this leg-
islation was drafted in order to impose reporting requirements 
on so-called "cult religions" such as the Unification Church and 
the Hare Krishnas. Instead of nullifying this enactment on the 
grounds that its purpose and/or effect was to (dis)favor certain 
religious organizations, the Court required Minnesota to demon-
strate that its enactment was the least restrictive means available 
9. The Eighth United States Circuit Court of Appeals had applied the tripartite standard 
and held that the chaplain provision violated all three elements oft he test. Chamber.rv. Marsh, 
675 F.2d 229 (8th Cir. 1982). 
10. Marsh v. Chamber.r, at 3338-40 Qustice Brennan dissenting). 
11. Other Court decisions have made use of history to support their conclusions. For 
example, in Walz v. Tax Commission, a 1969 decision that upheld New York's practice of 
granting property tax exemptions to religious and other social welfare organizations, the 
Court emphasized both the historical roots and apparent beneficient effects of this practice. 
For the Court: "A page of history is worth a volume of logic" (397 U.S. 664, 676 [1969]). 
12. Alternatively, Marsh could be read narrowly to apply only to practices adopted by the 
First Congress. See note 126. 
13. Lar.ron v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
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to attain some compelling state interest-a burden that the state 
failed to meet. The Court argued that application of this com-
pelling interest-least restrictive means test was appropriate since 
the Minnesota statute "makes explicit and deliberate distinctions 
between religious organizations." 14 
Larson, when issued, was considered by some courts to apply 
to governmental action that either benefited or regulated religion 
in an uneven manner. 15 Consequently, although Larson con-
cerned a discriminatory regulatory scheme, its principle conceiv-
ably could extend to the uneven granting of government benefits 
to religion. Under this interpretation, government displays of 
religious symbols would invoke the Larson test since benefits 
would extend only to those religions associated with the symbols 
on display. 
In addition to these two deviations from the tripartite test, the 
Supreme Court's application of the tripartite standard has been 
incredibly uneven. Apparently, the Court will craft its applica-
tion of the tripartite standard to suit its desired outcome. Two 
cases decided in the Court's 1982-83 term, Mueller v. Allen and 
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, support this contention.16 
In Mueller v. Allen, the Court upheld (five to four) a Minne-
sota tuition tax deduction scheme that permitted parents of public 
and private schoolchildren to deduct expenses incurred in provid-
ing "tuition, textbooks, and transportation" for their children. 
Noting that "at this point in the 20th Century we are quite far 
removed from the dangers that prompted the framers to include 
the establishment clause in the Bill of Rights," 17 the Court 
refused to consider the actual effect of the Minnesota program.l8 
Instead, Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, con-
tended: "We would be loathe to adopt a rule grounding the con-
stitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting 
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed 
benefits under the law."19 In fact, the Mueller majority recog-
nized that "the economic consequences of the program in [cases 
14. Ibid., at 247, n. 23. 
15. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties UnionofGeorgiav. Rabun County ChamberofCommerce, 
698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983); Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1983). 
16. See Devins, "Inconsistent Standards of Review"; Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 3062 
(1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 1035 S.Ct. 505 (1982). 
17. Mueller v. Allen, at 3069, quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) Qustice 
Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
18. For a detailed analysis of Mueller and its impact on government efforts to aid private 
schools, see Neal Devins, "The Supreme Court and Private Schools. An Update," Thi.r World 
8 (Spring 1984):13. 
19. Mueller v. Allen, at 3070. 
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where the Court invalidated the government program] and that 
in this case may be difficult to distinguish."ZO Under this "defer-
ential" analytical standard, the Court was able to conclude that 
the Minnesota program satisfied all three elements of the tripar-
tite test. 
The Mueller ruling is difficult to square with Larkin v. Gren-
del'.r Den. ZI In Larkin, the Court invalidated, by an eight-to-one 
margin, a Massachusetts statute that vested in the governing 
bodies of schools and churches the power to prevent the issuance 
of liquor licenses for premises within a radius of five hundred 
feet of the church or school. In so doing, the Court approved the 
application of strict standards of the variety rejected by the 
Mueller Court, namely: Laws "with only a remote and incidental 
effect advantageous to religious institutions" can pass constitu-
tional muster.ZZ Similarly, the Larkt'n Court rejected the proposi-
tion advanced in Mueller that "the risk of significant religious or 
denominational control over our democratic processes-or even 
of deep political division along religious lines-is remote. "23 
Instead, the Larkt'n Court approved of the Jeffersonian "wall of 
separation'' between church and state metaphor holding that 
"under our system the choice has been made that government is 
to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and 
churches excluded from the affairs of government. The Constitution 
demands that religion must be a private matter for the individ-
ual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that 
while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines 
must be drawn."Z4 For the Court, "The Framers did not set up 
a system of government in which important, discretionary govern-
20. Ibid., at 3067, n. 6, 3068. Mueller, thus, represents a substantial change in Establishment 
Clause analysis from a group of early and mid-1970s decisions that severely restricted state 
effons to aid private schools. In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, for example, the 
Court invalidated a New York statute that, in part, provided tuition reimbursement for 
low-income parents of children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary schools; 413 
u.s. 756 (1973). 
Writing for the majority,Justice Lewis F. Powell stressed that the Court would look at the 
actual effects of the enactment instead of accepting as true the legislature's finding of secular 
effect. Consequently, the Court found irrelevant the fact that parents received the reimburse-
ment, not private schools: "If the grants are offered as an incentive to parents to send their 
children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them, the establish-
ment clause is violated whether or not the actual dollars given eventually find their way into 
the sectarian institutions. Whether the grant is labeled a reimbursement, a reward, or a 
subsidy, its substantive impact is still the same" (ibid., at 786 [emphasis supplied]). 
21. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, at 505. 
22. Ibid., at 4026, quoting Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, at 756, 783 n. 39. 
23. Mueller v. Allen, at 3062, 3069, quoting Wolman v. Walter, at 263 Oustice Powell 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
24. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, at 505, 512, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, at 602, 625 (1971}. 
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mental powers would be delegated to or shared with religious 
institutions. ''25 
Taken together, Larkin and Mueller suggest that the Supreme 
Court has available to it two tripartite tests-one is a deferential 
test used to uphold government programs and the other is a 
strict scrutiny test used to invalidate such programs. Recent 
Supreme Court decisions suggest that the Court will make in-
creasing use of the deferential test. 26 At the time of the Lynch 
decision, however, it was unclear as to whether the Court would 
make use of the tripartite test and, if the Court utilized the tri-
partite test, whether it would apply a deferential or strict stand-
ard of review. 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOL CASE LAw 
Prior to Lynch, judicial rule making on the religious symbol 
issue was quite inconclusive. Aside from the nativity scene con-
troversy, this issue has generally arisen in four contexts-
namely, postings of the Ten Commandments, displays of the 
cross, celebration of religious events, and some recognition of 
this country's religious heritage-such as appeals to God-
printed on items made available to the public through the govern-
ment. The results in this group of cases are quite mixed and, 
thus, pointed to the need for the Supreme Court to resolve the 
religious symbols issue.27 
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS 
Three federal court decisions over the past ten years have been 
concerned with government displays of the Ten Commandments. 
In Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 28 the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the city's maintenance on courthouse 
grounds of an illuminated "3 X 5 foot granite monolith in-
scribed with a version of the Ten Commandments and certain 
other symbols representing the All Seeing Eye of God, the Star 
25. Ibid., at 512. 
26. See Devins, "The Supreme Court and Private Schools: An Update." 
27. One decision that loosely fits into the "religion symbol" category-but is not 
worthy of textual discussion-is Goldstein v. Fire Department of the Village of Suffern, New 
York, 559 F. Supp. 1289 {SONY 1983). Goldstein summarily invalidated the fire depart-
ment's posting of a sign that read, "Keep Christ in Christmas." The court followed the 
so-called Schempp rule that government "'may not employ religious means to reach a 
secular goal unless secular means are wholly unavailable"' (ibid., at 1389, quoting Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 Uustice Brennan concurring] [1962]). 
28. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d 29 (lOth Cir. 1973). 
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of David ... and Christ of Peace."29 The circuit court reasoned 
that although the monument "is at once religious and secular, 
... it does not seem reasonable to require removal of a passive 
monument, involving no compulsion, because its accepted pre-
cepts, as a foundation for law, reflect the religious nature of an 
ancient era .... The wholesome neutrality guaranteed by the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses does not dictate obliter-
ation of all our religious traditions."JO 
This spirit of benev.olent neutrality was absent in two other 
cases concerning the placement of the Ten Commandments in 
the public schools. In Ring v. Grand Forks Public District,ll the 
North Dakota district court invalidated a state law that required 
each school district to "cause a placard containing the Ten 
Commandments of the Christian religion to be displayed in a 
conspicious place in every school. "32 The state argued that "the 
Ten Commandments, although biblical in origin, are the cor-
nerstone of our legal system and thus have become secular in 
nature."JJ The court rejected this argument since the first three 
of the Ten Commandments are explicitly religious. The reason-
ing of the Ring court was adopted by the Supreme Court in Stone 
v. Grahm,H a case involving similar facts and issues. In Stone, 
the Court invalidated a Kentucky statute requiring the posting 
of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private 
contributions, on the wall of each public school classroom in the 
state. Although the state required that each plaque contain a 
printed notation that the Commandments serve as the funda-
mental legal code of Western civilization, the Court viewed the 
Commandments as plainly religious and, thus, concluded that 
the posting served no constitutional educational function. The 
Court also held that "it does not matter that the posted copies of 
the Ten Commandments are financed by voluntary private con-
tributions, for the mere posting of the copies under the auspices 
of the legislature provides the 'official support of the state ... ' 
that the Establishment Clause prohibits."JS 
Stone, by viewing the Commandments as purely religious, calls 
into question the Tenth Circuit's characterization of the Com-
mandments in Anderson. Moreover, "Stone, has been read as 
29. Ibid., at 30. 
30. Ibid., at 33-34. 
31. Ringv. Grand Fork.r PublicDi.rtrict, 483 F.Supp. 272 (D.N.D. 1980). 
32. Ibid., at 273. 
33. Ibid., at 274. 
34. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
35. Ibid., at 42, quoting Abington v. Schempp, at 203, 222. 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS AND ESTABLISHMENT 27 
permitting a court to infer a nonsecular purpose from govern-
ment involvement with a symbol or instrument it has deter-
mined to be patently religious."36 Considering the inextricably 
religious message of the first three commandments, the holdings 
in Stone and Ring seem correct. 37 
THE CROSS 
Five state court decisions and two federal court rulings, rang-
ing over a fifteen-year period, have addressed the constitutional-
ity of public displays of the cross. The apparent subjectivity and 
unpredictability of these cases are evidenced by two decisions of 
the Oregon Supreme Court concerning the same public display. 
In 1969, that court held in Lowe v. City of Eugene38 the issuance 
of a retroactive building permit to a private party for the erection 
of a cross (already built) on a municipal park that overlooked the 
city. The court initially held that the cross was a religious sym-
bol. The court then held that the cross served an impermissible 
religious purpose since it was "lighted" at Christmas and at 
Easter. In response to that ruling, a charter amendment was 
approved by the city accepting as a gift the cross as a "memorial 
or monument to United States war veterans." The Oregon 
Supreme Court upheld this gift in 1976 in Eugene Sand and 
Gravel v. City of Eugene. 39 Although recognizing that the cross 
was still a religious symbol and its display very prominent, the 
court concluded that it served a primarily secular function in the 
context of a war memorial. The court also noted that a plaque 
describing the cross as a tribute to veterans was placed next to 
the cross; and that the cross was lit only "on appropriate days or 
seasons which fittingly represent the patriotic sacrifice of war 
veterans.'' 40 
The display of crosses was also approved in two other deci-
sions. In the 1967 Paul v. Dade County41 decision, the Florida 
36. Jill Vutter Fuchs, "Publicly-Funded Display of Religious Symbols: TheN ativity Scene 
Controversy," University of Cincinnati Law Review 51 (1982):353, 363. 
37. Significantly, Stone and Ring do not absolutely prohibit public display of the Com-
mandments. Instead, these cases demand that the Commandments be presented in such a way 
as not to connote government approval of the Commandments' religious message. For 
example, the Commandments could be displayed in a museum exhibit concerning the history 
of Western civilization. 
38. Lowe v. City of Eugene, 463 P.2d 360 (Or. 1969). 
39. Eugene Sand and Gravelv. City of Eugene, 558 P.2d 338 (Or. 1976). 
40. Ibid., at 344. The court probably would have approved of the cross being lit during the 
Christmas season and on such holidays as Memorial Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, 
and Independence Day. 
41. Paul v. Dade County, 202 So. 2nd 833 (Fla. 1967). 
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Court of Appeals upheld the display of a cross at the Miami 
courthouse. This decision was incomplete, however, since the 
court failed to determine whether the display had a religious 
effect. In 1972, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the dis-
play of a fifty-foot cross-erected by a local coalition of churches-
at a city fair.42 The court reasoned that the cross could not have 
a religious effect since it was displayed "in a distinctly secular 
environment in the midst of persons in pursuit of distinctively 
secular entertainment."43 The Oklahoma court paid no attention 
to either the prominence of the display or the religiosity of the 
cross. 
The California Supreme Court viewed the public display of 
the cross in a different fashion when it invalidated Los Angeles's 
authorization of illumination of a huge cross on city hall to 
honor the Christmas and Easter holidays. This 1978 decision, 
Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 44 viewed the city's practice as religious 
favoritism. For the court, "The city hall is not an immense bul-
letin board whereon symbols of all faith could be thumbtacked 
or otherwise displayed .... To illuminate only the Latin cross 
does seem preferential when comparable recognition of other 
religious symbols is impractical."4S 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also disapproved of a 
public display of the cross in their 1983 decision, American Civil 
Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce. 46 
Rabun concerned the constitutionality of a state-approved, illumi-
nated twenty-six feet by thirty-five feet cross in Black Rock 
Mountain State Park. Although erected and maintained (through 
funds provided by area churches) by the local chamber of com-
merce, the federal appellate court held that the placement of the 
cross on public land violated the Establishment Clause. Central 
to this ruling was a press release issued by the chamber that 
suggested that the chamber's purpose was to advance the Chris-
tian religion. The release stated in part: "The cross is a symbol 
of Christianity for millions of people in this great nation and the 
world. "47 Based on this release and the failure of the chamber to 
proffer a plausible "secular purpose" for the display, the appel-
late court concluded that the state of Georgia had an affirmative 
42. Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 496 P. 2d 789 (Okl. 1972). 
43. Ibid., at 792. 
44. Fox v. City of Los .Angeles, !50 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1968). 
45. Ibid., at 869. 
46. .American CiviiLiberti'es Um"onofGeorgia v. Rabun County C/zambtrofCommrrce, 698 F.2d 
1098 (11th Cir. 1983). 
47. Ibid., at llOl. 
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obligation to remove the cross. 
Another federal court, however, ruled that in certain instances 
the public display of the cross is constitutional. In the 1981 John-
son v. Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County48 deci-
sion, the United States District Court for New Mexico upheld 
the county's inclusion of the cross on the county seal. Noting 
that Catholicism was the state church at the time of Bernalillo 
County's origin, the district court concluded "that the cross in 
the seal represents the Spanish and Catholic traditions of early 
New Mexico and of Bernalillo County."49 
Bernalillo County seems properly decided. The Catholic Church 
played a significant role in the development of America's South-
west. Public recognition of this role provides no more than a 
permissible remote and incidental benefit to religion. At the 
same time, it is hard to accept the upholding of the public dis-
play of the cross in any other of these cases. The display of the 
crosses in Fox, Paul, and Lowe were all tied to a religious holi-
day. A cross at a war memorial, as in Eugene Sand, is arguably 
"nonreligious." The prominence of the location and the suspi-
cious change in the use of the Eugene cross, however, makes 
problematic the Eugene Sand holding. Finally, the size and spon-
sorship of the cross in the Oklahoma and Georgia cases also 
suggests that those displays had the purpose and effect of advanc-
ing religion. 
RELIGIOUS HERITAGE 
Three federal court decisions have been issued concerning 
government recognition of America's monotheistic Judea-
Christian heritage. These cases raise the issue of whether and 
when it is appropriate for government to recognize explicitly 
that religion is a part of that culture and that Americans believe 
in God. Courts generally accommodate government practices 
which recognize that, as Justice Douglas said, "we are a reli-
gious people."50 In the 1967 Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State v. O'Brien,Sl the Washington, D.C. District 
Court upheld the Post Office Department's issuance of a com-
memorative Christmas postage stamp reproducing in miniature 
48. Johnson v. Board of County Commi.r.rionersojBema/il/o County, 528 F.Supp. 919 (D.N.M. 
1981). 
49. Ibid., at 924. 
50. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952). 
51. Americans UmiedforSeparati'onojCizurclzandStatev. O'Brien, 272 F.Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 
1967). 
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Hans Memling's famous painting of "Madonna and Child with 
Angels." Recognizing that the stamp replication was "a design 
of religious significance," the court, however, summarily con-
cluded that to suggest that the replication was "a form of prose-
lytizing, is as remote and far-fetched as to be entitled to but 
scant consideration."52 In many respects, the court's analysis was 
premised on the belief that "religion is an inherent, permeating 
and pervading strain of our national life. It would be impossible 
to disarray, sever, or prevent every connection and every contact 
between religion and government, or to extricate every trace and 
vestige of religion from government." 53 
Another case where the courts utilized America's religious 
heritage as a basis for upholding the government's recognition of 
religious belief was the 1970 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision in Arnow v. United States. 54 Arnow upheld the inscrip-
tion of "In God We Trust" on United States currency. The 
Arnow court simply held that the motto's "use is of a patriotic or 
ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a govern-
mental sponsorship of a religious exercise." 55 
Unlike the recognition of this religious heritage, when govern-
ment advocation of a present belief in God is at issue, courts 
universally find such practices unconstitutional. In the context 
of religious symbolism, this issue was raised in a 1980 Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Hall v. Bradshaw. 56 Hall con-
cerned the North Carolina Department of Transportation's print-
ing of a "motorist's prayer" on a state map published and dis-
tributed free of charge by the department. This prayer began, 
"Our heavenly Father, we ask this day a particular blessing as 
we take the wheel of our car,"57 and continued predictably 
therefrom. The Hall court concluded that the printing of this 
prayer clearly had the impermissible effect of promoting a par-
ticular brand of religious belief. For the court: "By printing a 
prayer on the official map, the state is placing its power and 
support behind a particular form of theological belief, and state 
sponsorship of religious belief is one of the primary encroach-
ments the [Establishment] clause seeks to inhibit .... The state 
necessarily offends the sensibilities of [both] non-believers [and] 
52. Ibid., at 721. 
53. Ibid., at 719. 
54. Arnow v. United StaU.t, 432 F.Zd 242 (9th Cir. 1970). 
55. Ibid., at 243. 
56. Hallv. Bradshaw, 630 F.Zd 1018 (4th Cir. 1980). 
57. Ibid., at 1019. 
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devout believers among the citizenry who regard prayer 'as a 
necessarily private experience.' "ss 
These three cases all seem properly resolved. Considering the 
clear denominational association with the Madonna, 0 'Brien was 
a tougher case than the district court let on. America's religious 
tradition, however-as reflected in many of the great works of 
art housed in museums-suggests that the district court was jus-
tified in its holding. Arnow and Hall were not closed questions. 
The "In God We Trust" motto is of historical and cultural 
value. It neither encourages nor discourages religious practice. 
The opposite can be said of North Carolina's highway prayer. 
That prayer is an active call for a specified type of religious 
practice. 
RELIGIOUS EVENTS 
Government's erection of a religious symbol for temporary 
display in order to facilitate the observance of a religious event 
on public property was disapproved by the courts in the one case 
that directly raised this issue. In the 1980 Gifi//an v. City of Phi'/a-
de/phia59 decision, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated 
the city of Philadelphia's efforts to assume the cost of a papal 
mass at Philadelphia's Logan Circle. The city, in addition to 
crowd control and other related expenses, "expended a gross 
total of $310,7 41 to construct and prepare the Papal platform. 
The platform was designed with the approval of the Archdiocese 
of Philadelphia, by staff architects employed by the city .... A 
thirty-six foot high Christian cross was constructed on the main 
platform and was lighted at the city's expense a week before the 
Pope's arrival. By special order of the mayor, the cross and plat-
form remained in place for over two weeks after the mass.'' 60 
A divided panel of the third circuit court concluded that the 
58. Ibid., at 1020-21, quoting .Abington v. Schempp, at 203, 285 (1962) Qustice Brennan 
concurring). 
59. Gijillan "· Cziy of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 1980). Giftllan did not hold that 
public property could not be used for religious purposes. America's religious heritage clearly 
supports the granting of gm·ernment permits to religious (and nonreligious) organizations on 
a nondiscriminatory basis. See, e.g., Baird"· White, 476 F.Supp. 442 (D. Mass. 1979) 
upholding the city of Boston's granting to the local archdiocese control of an area adjacent to 
the altar on Boston Common where the pope would celebrate a papal Mass; O'Hair v . 
.Andrews, 613 F.Zd 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) upholding Department of Interior expenditures for 
park police services in relation to a papal Mass given on the public national mall located in 
Washington, D.C. 
60. Theodore H. Smith, "Separation of Church and State, a Reaffirmation," Temple Law 
Quarterly 54 (1981):930, 932. 
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city's actions violated all three prongs of the Establishment 
Clause test. The secular purpose and secular effect requirements 
were not satisfied since the platform was specially designed for 
the celebration of Holy Mass by the pope. 6I Additionally, the 
joint planning of the Mass by the city and the archdiocese 
created impermissible excessive entanglement between the city 
and the church. A dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Aldisert 
that argued, in part, that the papal Mass was a secular event 
since the pope is head of a secular state. 
The third circuit ruling was a proper response to the city's 
overzealous effort to share with the archdiocese in the promotion 
and celebration of the papal Mass. Considering the explicitly 
religious nature of the Mass, the city's activities must be con-
strued as impermissible government sponsorship of religion. 
THE NATIVITY ScENE CoNTROVERSY 
Lynch v. Donnelly presented the Supreme Court with an bppor-
tunity to set up an analytical standard for future judicial review 
of this type of case. Lynch raises two issues essential to the reso-
lution of a "religious symbol" case, namely: whether and when 
some object associated with both secular and religious events is 
religious, and whether and when a religious object can convey a 
predominantly secular meaning. Lynch also called into question 
the viability of the tripartite test for Establishment Clause review. 
As shall be demonstrated, the Supreme Court's Lynch decision 
provided very little in the way of definitive clarification of either 
of these issues. At the same time, the tenor of the Court's opin-
ion comes perilously close to endorsing an approach to Estab-
lishment Clause adjudication that would uphold most govern-
ment benefits to (all or select) religions. Apparently, government 
would have to vest political decision-making authority in reli-
gious institutions to violate the Establishment Clause. 6Z 
Any object closely tied to some religious holiday, practice, or 
belief should be defined as religious. This was the message con-
61. The city had asserted that these expenditures served a valuable public relations function. 
The appellate court flatly rejected this contention, noting that: "By so arguing, the City 
places itself in a difficult position. Viewers of the ceremony that do not know of the city-
sponsorship are likely to believe only that the Archdiocese, not the City, made a special effort. 
The Archdiocese, not the City, will receive the public relations 'bonanza.' But if the city 
sponsorship is known, that aid connotes state approval of a particular religion, one of the 
specific evils the Establishment Clause was designed to prevent" (637 F.2d 924-, 930 [3rd Cir. 
1980]). 
62. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, at 505. 
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veyed by the Supreme Court in Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 63 Engel v. Vitale, 64 and Stone v. Graham. 65 These deci-
sions suggest that the nativity scene will be viewed as clearly 
religious and, thus, trigger Establishment Clause review. Schempp 
held unconstitutional Bible reading in the public schools. Engel 
similarly invalidated nondenominational school prayer. In both 
cases, the Court viewed the Bible as an inherently religious 
instrument and, thus, concluded that the school programs vio-
lated the Establishment Clause since government is " 'utilizing 
the prestige, power, and influence' of a public institution to 
bring religion into the lives of citizens."66 The Court, however, 
did note "that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and 
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as 
part of a secular program of education, may not be effected con-
sistently with the First Amendment."67 Similar to these cases 
involving the Bible, the Court in Stone invalidated a Kentucky 
statute mandating the posting of the Ten Commandments. The 
Court, as mentioned, held that the Commandments were clearly 
religious. 
63. Abington v. Schempp, at 203. 
64. Engelv. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
65. Stone v. Graham, at 39. 
66. Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970). But see Florey v. Sioux Falls School 
District49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980). The Florey Court found constitutional under the 
tripartite standard public school Christmas assemblies. The school board claimed that it 
supported such programs because "one of its educational goals is to advance the students' 
knowledge and appreciation of the role that our religious heritage has played in the social, 
cultural and historical development of civilization" (ibid., at 1314). The eighth circuit court, 
pointing to language in Engel and Schempp that approved the study-but not practice-of 
religion, correctly suggested that the germane question was whether a genuine "secular 
program of education is furthered by the [program]" (ibid., at 1316). The eighth circuit court 
answered this question in the affirmative: "Only holidays with both religious and secular 
bases may be observed; music, art, literature and drama may be included in the curriculum 
only if presented in a prudent and objective manner and only as a part of the cultural and 
religious heritage of the holiday; and religious symbols may be used only as a teaching aid or 
resource and only if they are displayed as a part of the cultural and religious heritage of the 
holiday and are temporary in nature. Since all programs and materials authorized by the rules 
must deal with the secular or cultural basis or heritage of the holidays and since the materials 
must be presented in a prudent and objective manner and symbols used as a teaching aid, the 
advancement of a 'secular program of education,' and not of religion, is the primary effect of 
the rules" (ibid., at 1317). Although the circuit court based this decision on school district 
guidelines and not school practices, Florey seems a proper recognition of the central role that 
religion plays in this culture. Key to the eighth circuit ruling was the fact that affirmative steps 
would be taken to ensure that students would perceive the Christmas assembly as a cultural 
event. The nativity scene display upheld by the Supreme Court, however, did not include any 
sort of statement suggesting that the creche's cultural significance was the basis of its 
inclusion in the display. 
67. Abington v. Schempp, at 203, 225. 
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The apparently pervasive religiosity of the nativity scene sug-
gests that a public display of the creche in isolation (and not as 
part of some larger seasonal display) would be found unconstitu-
tional. Supportive of this conclusion is McCreary v. Stone,6B a 
1983 decision of the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. McCreary upheld the city of Scarsdale, 
New York's denial of access to the Scarsdale Creche Committee 
of a village-owned park for the purpose of displaying a privately 
owned nativity scene. In reaching this decision, the McCreary 
court was forced to determine that the public display violated the 
Establishment Clause. Otherwise, the city would have improp-
erly limited the Creche Committee's First Amendment freedom-
of-speech right of equal access to a public forum.69 The McCreary 
court, applying the tripartite test, concluded that the display 
clearly had the impermissible "primary effect" of advancing the 
Christian religion. Central to this ruling was a significant 
amount of evidence that suggested that both area residents and 
sponsors of the creche considered the display of primarily reli-
gious significance. 70 
McCreary, although significant, does not speak to the issue 
raised in other nativity scene cases, namely, can government 
either sponsor or display a creche in the context of purportedly 
secularly seasonal display.7I 
68. McCreary v. Stone, 575 F.Supp. 1112 (S.D.N. Y. 1983). A nearly identical challenge had 
been dismissed in 1977 on procedural grounds. Rubin v. Village ofScarJdale, 440 F.Supp. 607 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
69. McCreary v. Stone, at 1122. The Supreme Court's 1983 decision, Perry Educatt'o11 Auoda-
tion v. Perry Local Educators Association, mandates this conclusion, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983), Perry 
held that in regard to "quintessential public forums [such as streets or parks] ... the state 
(may] enforce a content based exclusion [only if] it .•• show(s] that its regulation is necessary 
to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (ibid., at 
955). In McCreary, the city claimed that its "denial [of access] was necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest because to allow the erection of the creche on public property would 
violate the Establishment Clause" (575 F.Supp. 1112, 1126 [S.D.N.Y. 1983]). 
70. Examples include: (I) a statement of the clergy from the Scarsdale churches that noted: 
"In keeping with ourrespect for one another's beliefs and in keeping with our government's 
position to protect religious freedom without promoting or restricting particular religious 
views, we believe that it is inappropriate to use public property to make a religious statement" 
(McCreary v. Stone, at 1112, 1118); (2) a significant numberofthose letters received by the city 
in opposition to its decision "perceived the problem as one stemming from a difference 
between Christians and Jews .... "(ibid., at 1119); and (3) a petition subscribed to by about 
eighty or so signatures, stated, "'V nless we are mistaken the United States is regarded by the 
world as a Christian country, and the creche is simply a symbol of our Christianity'" (ibid.). 
71. Two lower New York State court decisions, however, contradict McCreary :r holding. 
See, Baerv. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1958);Lawrencev. Buchmueller, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 87 
(1963). Both of these cases, however, were decided prior to the Supreme Court's 1971 
adoption of the tripartite test. Additionally, there are apparent analytic defects in both cases. 
In Baer, the court effectively eliminated the "secular effect" requirement, noting that "the 
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, relying on the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Lynch v. Donnelly, overturned the dis-
trict court ruling in McCreary. 72 Agreeing with the district 
court's determinations that the village-owned park is a tradi-
tional public forum, and that the nativity scene display is a form 
of speech,73 the appellate court ruled that " 'in order to justify 
discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the reli-
gious content of the group's intended speech, the [City] . . . 
must show that its [decision] is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' " 74 In 
light of Lynch, the appellate court concluded that the city could 
not justify its prohibition. The fact that the Scarsdale nativity 
scene was not part of some larger Christmas display, unlike the 
Pawtucket display at issue in Lynch, was considered irrelevant by 
the second circuit court. The appellate court argued that "the 
Supreme Court did not decide the Pawtucket case based upon 
the physical context within which the display of the creche was 
situated; rather, the Court consistently referred to 'the creche in 
the context of the Christmas season,' or the 'Christmas Holiday 
Season.'"75 As noted later,76 the appellate court was accurate in 
its characterization of the majority ruling in Lynch. At the same 
time, the Supreme Court has agreed to review during this term 
the appellate court's decision. 
The fact that a nativity scene is labeled religious does not 
necessarily mean that the government is absolutely prohibited 
from either funding the display of the nativity scene or permit-
ting a private party to erect such a display. In fact, two lower 
federal courts have held that displays of the nativity scene on 
public grounds do not promote religion. The Washington, D.C. 
Court of Appeals held in the 1973 Allen v. Morton77 decision that 
Creche is undoubtedly a religious symbol. In viewing it, however, we are all free to interpret 
its meaning according to our own religious faith" (181 N.Y.S. 2d 230, 238 [1958]). In 
Lawrence, the state court simply failed to provide any justification for its ruling. 
72. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
73. Ibid., at 722-23. . 
74. Ibid., at 723, quoting Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269-70 (1981). 
75. Ibid., at 729, quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1362. The appellate court, however, 
required the city to erect a sign stating that the display has been erected and maintained by a 
private group; ibid., at 728. 
76. See pages 38-45. 
77. Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court, however, held the display 
unconstitutional since federal participation in the planning of the display constituted exces-
sive governmental entanglement in religious matters. See also A/len v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) overturning district court grant of defendant's summary judgment motion 
on this issue since "secular effect" question was substantial enough to require district court 
resolution. 
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the federal government did not promote religion by permitting 
the display of an illuminated life-size nativity scene on federal 
park land. The Allen court recognized that rc 'aid normally may 
be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion . . . 
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise 
essentially secular setting.' "78 The court, however, felt that sev-
eral other factors spoke to the constitutionality of the display. 
First, the display was part of the annual Pageant of Peace-rcan 
admittedly secular event whose only 'religious• content is that it 
recognizes the religious heritage aspect of Christmas by means 
of an admittedly religious symbol."79 Second, explanatory plaques 
were placed on the grounds of the pageant that explained both 
the secular nature of the pageant and the role of the nativity 
scene in such a secular event. Third, government involvement in 
the pageant did not include activities relating to the financing, 
maintenance, or storage of the nativity scene. The court thus 
concluded that the display rcshould not be considered in isolation 
but as an integral part of the whole of the [secular] Pageant."BO 
These mitigating factors were not present in Citizens Concerned 
for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver 
II, 81 a 1981 decision of the Colorado district court that upheld a 
publicly funded display of a nativity scene on public property. 
The key to this decision was the district court's holding that the 
nativity scene is not a pervasively religious symbol and conse-
quently the plaintiffs must demonstrate a rc direct and imme-
diate" religious effect. For the court, rcThe nativity scene has 
been used sufficiently in secular settings, and has been suffi-
ciently integrated into our nation•s folklore that [its] message 
.... [may have] a sign of the holiday season on a par with Santa 
and mistletoe."S2 Engel, Schempp, and Stone, by defining the 
78. Allen v. Morton, at 72, n. 12, quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). 
79. Ibid., at 74. 
80. Ibid. This balancing approach was recently criticized by the district court in McCreary. 
According to that court: "[I]f cases such as this were to turn on minutiae like the visibility or 
lack of ambiguity of disclaiming signs, the size or relative size of the symbol, the length of 
time for the display, or the potentially myriad other factors which possibly could be held to 
affect the outcome, the courts would become hopelessly entangled in the problem, and 
perhaps more importantly, villages like Scarsdale would endlessly be in and out of court" (575 
F. Supp. 1112, 1133 [S.D.N.Y. 1983]). 
81. C1iizens ConcemedforSeparation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver II, 526 F. 
Supp.1310(D. Colo.1981). ButseeCitizen.rConcemed, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo.1979)rt"V~ 
628 F.2d 1289 (lOth Cir. 1980). In the earlier case, the district court enjoined the city from 
including the nativity scene in its Christmas display. The tenth circuit reversed, claiming that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. A state constitutional claim on this issue is 
presently pending before a state trial court in Colorado. See Conrad v. City and County of 
Denver, 659 P.2d 662 (Colo. 1983). 
82. Citizens Concemedv. Denver II, at 1310, 1313. To support this claim, the court noted 
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Bible and Ten Commandments as pervasively religious, held 
that plaintiffs need only demonstrate a "remote and incidental" 
effect. 
The court in Citizens Concerned II then held that "[the nativity 
scene] is part of an overall [secular] Christmas display of tradi-
tional Christmas symbols of short duration and is displayed with 
equal prominence as such holiday favorites as Santa and Ru-
dolph."83 Finally, the Citizens Concerned II court disregarded tes-
timony by psychologists and Denver residents that they consid-
ered the display religious, holding that "the First Amendment 
does not require the prerogatives of government [to] be limited 
by the sensibilities of its most sensitive or fastidious citizens. "84 
Ironically, the Colorado district court had earlier ruled in a 
nearly identical case that the display of the Denver creche vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. This 1979 decision, Citizens Con-
cerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of 
Denver I, 85 was overturned on jurisdictional grounds in 1980 by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.86 The district court in Citi-
zens Concerned I placed great emphasis on the testimony of psy-
chologists, theologians, and Denver residents87 -evidence con-
sidered irrelevant by the Citizens Concerned II court. Based on 
such evidence, the Citizens Concerned I court concluded "that the 
"that nativity scenes are seen in department stores, commercial establishments as well as in 
public places to symbolize the celebration of Christmas, a national holiday" (ibid.). 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid., at 1315. See note 87. 
85. Citizen.r Concerned v. Denver I, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D. Colo. 1979). For an extensive 
discussion of this case, see Jonathan J. Chase, "Litigating a Nativity Scene," Saint Loui.r 
Univer.rity Law Journa/24 (1980):237. 
86. Citizen.r Concernedv. Denver I, 628 F.2d 1289 (lOth Cir. 1980). 
87. Examples of this evidence include the following: (1) A professor of religious studies "saw 
the creche as the incarnation of God in Christ, and he described Christmas symbols such as 
Santa Claus, lights, trees, and others as different from the Nativity Scene because they are 
decorations which are not universally Christian" ( Citizen.r Conarnedv.Denver I, 481 F. Supp. 
522, 526 [D. Colo. 1979}); (2) "A clinical psychologist with an expertise in child psychology 
testified that in her professional opinion such a public display of apparent governmental 
support of a majoritarian view has negative effects on the children in religious minority 
families because it tends to encourage prejudice among the majority, and because it encour-
ages self-degredation and diminished self-esteem among the minority" (ibid., at 526); and (3) 
Letters sent to the mayor in support of the creche that included statements such as: "God and 
Christ in our lives has always been what America is all about"; "We as taxpayers have a right 
to express to the people that we are Christian"; and " ... if we are a Christian nation we 
should do something to demonstrate that fact" (ibid., at 529). See also note 71. See Citizen.r 
Concerned II, however, which cited expert testimony suggesting that "the secular and reli-
gious sides of Christmas have been intertwined throughout history and it is difficult to 
separate the two"; and that "the nativity scene is being increasingly used in juxtaposition to 
the secular symbols of Christmas" (Citizen.r Concernedv. Denver II, 526 F.Supp. 1310, 1313 
[D. Colo. 1981]). 
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City's placement of the Nativity Scene on the front steps of the 
City and County Building (the very building to which the citi-
zens must turn for government) is widely viewed as an affirma-
tion and support of the tenets of the Christian faith." 88 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court in Citizens Concerned I alleged that 
"the mere fact that the rest of the Christmas display is secular, 
and so recognized, does not mitigate this constitutionally objec-
tionable result. "89 The court based its approach on Supreme 
Court Establishment Clause decisions holding that "aid normally 
may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion 
... when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise 
substantially secular setting."90 
The Supreme Court's majority ruling in Lynch v. Donnelly was 
quite similar to the district court decision in Citizens Concerned 
II. 9l Factually, Lynch was nearly identical to Citizens Concerned. 
The only real difference (which was ignored in the lower and 
Supreme Court decisions) was that Pawtucket's city-owned na-
tivity scene was displayed in a privately owned park. 
The district and appellate courts in Lynch disagreed with the 
Citizens Concerned II reasoning. Unlike Citizens Concerned II, 
which claimed "that the nativity scene has been used sufficiently 
in secular settings, and has been sufficiently integrated into our 
nation's folklore that the message conveyed by its use as a sym-
bol is ambiguous,"92 the district court in Lynch reasoned that 
unlike other Christmas symbols such as a star, a bell, or a tree, 
which "attains a religious dimension only if the viewer under-
stands that it is intended to connote something more than its 
facial significance ... [the nativity scene] is more immediately 
connected to the religious impact of Christmas because it is a 
direct representation of the full biblical account of the birth of 
Christ."93 This determination led the district court in Lynch to 
apply the "remote and incidental" benefit to religion standard. 
88. Citizens Concerned v. Denwr I, 481 F.Supp. 522, 529 (D. Colo. 1979). 
89. Ibid. 
90. Ibid., at 530. 
91. See David 0. Stewart, "Taking Christ Out of Christmas?" American Bar Assodatiott 
Journa/69 (December 1983):1832. For example, in addition to the creche, the Pawtucket 
display "includes Santa's house, stars, Christmas trees, a model of reindeer pulling Santa's 
sleigh, (etc.)" (ibid.). Additionally, "for the plaintiffs, a Methodist minister emphasized the 
religious symbolism of the nativity scene, and a clinical psychologist stressed the negative 
impact that [the public display of a creche] would have on non-Christian children. The city 
presented a philosophy professor who specializes in religious matters. He said the nativity 
scene •.. was without religious significance in such a secular setting" (ibid., at 1835). 
92. Citizens Concerned v. Denver II, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (D. Colo. 1981). 
93. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1167 (D.R.I. 1981). 
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Also supportive of the application of a strict standard of review, 
the district court concluded that the nativity scene "had not 
been included for cultural or traditional reasons as an example of 
how Americans celebrate the [Christmas] holiday, for it found 
that no attempt had been made to disclaim any endorsement of 
the religious message, and more importantly that the only reli-
gious heritage and customs acknowledged by the display were 
those of the Christian majority of Pawtucket's citizenry."94 
Finally, the district court, unlike Citizens Concerned II, viewed 
the nativity scene in isolation rather than as part of a secular 
display. For the court: "So long as the viewer possesses the 
background knowledge necessary to comprehend what the sym-
bol is meant to stand for, the symbol does not lose its power as a 
communicative device simply by being taken out of its original, 
or optimal, context. "95 
The Lynch district court strictly applied the tripartite standard 
in its invalidation of the Pawtucket display. Following guide-
lines established by the Supreme Court in cases like Stone, Engel, 
and Schempp, (and most recently applied in Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den), the lower court placed a nearly impossible burden on the 
state to justify its display of a patently religious object. 96 In 
affirming the district court's opinion, a divided panel of the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Larson compelling state 
interest-least restrictive means standard. Application of this stand-
ard was comprehensible since the Supreme Court did not clarify 
in Larson whether the "compelling interest" test applied solely 
to uneven regulatory interference-or whether that test extended 
to uneven government benefits. 97 The first circuit held that the 
test applied to uneven government benefits of the sort at issue in 
Lynch, namely, the government's singling out of Christianity. 9B 
The Supreme Court rejected both the appellate court's use of 
the Larson standard and its ruling that the Pawtucket display 
had the effect of advancing the Christian religion. Instead of 
utilizing the Larson standard, the justices applied a deferential 
tripartite test. At the same time, the majority explicitly recog-
nized that the Larson standard could, on occasion, be a viable 
94. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1033 (1st Cir. 1982). 
95. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1167-68 (D.R.I. 1981). 
96. See Fuchs, "Publicly-Funded Displays of Religious Symbols," 365-72. 
97. See notes 13-15. 
98. According to the court: "Larson makes clear that because the City's ownership and use 
of the nativity scene is an act which discriminates between Christian and non-Christian 
religions it must be evaluated under the test of strict scrutiny" (691 F.Zd 1029, 1034 [1st Cir. 
1982]). 
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alternative to the tripartite test.99 The majority, however, failed 
to specify when application of the Larson test is appropriate.lOO 
The five-member majority then concluded that the Pawtucket 
display satisfied all three prongs of the tripartite test.lOl 
Setting the tone for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger noted at the outset of his opinion that "some relationship 
between government and religious organizations is inevitable" 
and that the Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommoda-
tion, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility 
towards any."IOZ This notion of "affirmative accommodation" 
represents a retreat from the Court's previously stated view on 
the purposes of the Establishment Clause. 
In the 1971 school aid decision, Lemon v. Kurtzman,I03 Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, contended that the tlauthors 
[of the Establishment Clause] did not simply prohibit the estab-
lishment of a state church or a state religion." 104 Instead, they 
sought to forestall "the three main evils against which the Estab-
lishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 1sponsorship, 
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activity."'IOS In Lynch, however, the chief justice quoted 
Joseph Story to support a nearly opposite interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause: "The real object of the [First] Amend-
ment was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establish-
ment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage 
of the national government."I06 With this in mind, the Lynch's 
approval of the Pawtucket display is not surprising. 
The Lynch Court did not speak of the nativity scene display as 
presenting a minimal risk of a state-sponsored church, however, 
Instead, the Court ultimately rested 'its decision on the purport-
edly secular nature of the Pawtucket display. For the Court: 
"The City ... has principally taken note of a significant histori-
cal religious event long celebrated in the Western World. The 
creche in the display depicts the historical origins of this tradi-
tional event long recognized as a National Holiday."I07 Conse-
99. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1362. 
100. The majority opinion merely stated that "we are unable to see this display, or any part 
of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson" (ibid., at 1366, n. 13). 
101. Ibid., at 1365. 
102. Ibid., at 1359. 
103. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
104. Ibid., at 612. 
105. Ibid., quoting Wa/z v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664,682 (1969). 
106. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1361, quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constltution 
of the United States (1803), 728. 
107. Ibid., at 1363. 
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quently, the district court view that the city display was reli-
giously motivated since the nativity scene is pervasively religious 
was rejected. 108 Instead, the Lynch majority concluded that "the 
display is sponsored by the City [for legitimate secular purposes, 
e.g.] to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that 
Holiday. " 109 
This aspect of the Court's ruling seems consistent with the 
bulk of Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions.ll0 In 
Mueller v. Allen,lll for example, the Court explicitly noted its 
"reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, 
particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's pro-
gram may be discerned from the face of the statute." ll2 Paw-
tucket's argument that the creche served important cultural 
values as well as enhanced seasonal goodwill thus satisfies this 
secular purpose requirement. 
The Lynch majority also overturned the lower court finding 
that the Pawtucket display had the impermissible effect of favor-
ing or sanctioning Christian beliefs over other religious beliefs. 
First, the majority rejected the district court view that the nativ-
ity scene be independently scrutinized and instead insisted that 
"the focus of our inquiry must be on the creche in the context 
of the Christmas season."113 The focus of this inquiry, however, 
was not on the otherwise secular character of the display. In-
stead, the majority emphasized that all Christmas-time celebra-
tions are rooted in religious belief. For the majority: "To forbid 
the use of this one passive symbol-the creche-at the very time 
people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and 
carols in public schools and other places, and while the Congress 
and Legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains 
would be a stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and our 
holdings."114 
Second, the Lynch majority sought to support their conclusion 
by way of analogy. For example, the majority noted that the 
"display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorse-
108. The district court in Lynch applied the analytical standard apparently approved by the 
Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham, namely, that a "court [may] infer a nonsecular purpose 
from government involvement with a symbol or instrument it has determined to be patently 
religious" (Fuchs, "Publicly-Funded Displays of Religious Symbols," 363). 
109. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1363. 
llO. But see discussion of Stone v. Graham, notes 35-37. 
lll. Mueller v. Allen, at 3062 (1983). 
112. Ibid., at 3066. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 4-21 U.S. 349,363 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 
433 u.s. 299,236 (1977). 
113. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1362. 
114. Ibid., at 1365. 
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ment of religion that the Congressional and Executive recogni-
tion of the origins of the Holiday itself as 'Christ's Mass,' or the 
exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in govern-
mentally supported museums" and that "to conclude that the 
primary effect of including the creche is to advance religion ... 
would require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an 
endorsement of religion . . . [than] expenditures of public funds 
for transportation of students to church-sponsored schools" and 
several other expenditures of large sums of public money to sup-
port church-sponsored .schools approved by this Court. liS These 
analogies are unconvincing, however. Aid to private schools can 
be couched in neutral terms (e.g., provision of secular services); 
it serves a vital public function, and most importantly-extends 
to secular and non-Christian sectarian private schools. Religious 
paintings displayed in museums are works of art, despite their 
denominational message. Finally, in regard to government rec-
ognition of Christmas day as a public holiday, "to say that 
government may recognize the holiday's traditional, secular 
elements of gift-giving, public festivities and community spirit, 
does not mean that government may indiscriminantly embrace 
the distinctively sectarian aspects of the holiday."116 
Emphasizing these (and other) limitations in the majority's 
analogies as well as disagreeing with the majority's conclusion 
that a Christmas-time creche is a passive secular symbol, Justice 
William Brennan, writing for four dissenting justices, vigorously 
attacked the majority opinion. First, Justice Brennan criticized 
the majority's conclusion that inclusion of the nativity scene in 
the Pawtucket display served a secular purpose. For Justice 
Brennan: "The nativity scene, unlike every other element of the 
. .. display, reflects a sectarian exclusivity that the avowed pur-
poses of celebrating the holiday season and promoting retail 
commerce [in the downtown area surrounding the park] simply 
do not encompass."ll7 On this issue, Justice Brennan's analysis 
is more comprehensive than the district court, which simply 
held that government involvement with a patently religious 
object is a per se violation of the Establishment Clause's secular 
purpose requirement. 
The dissent was equally critical of the majority's conclusion 
that the nativity scene display had a secular effect. According to 
Justice Brennan: "I refuse to accept the notion implicit in to-
115. Ibid., at 1364. 
116. Ibid., at 1373 Gustice Brennan dissenting). 
117. Ibid. 
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day's decision that non-Christians would find that the religious 
content of the creche is eliminated by the fact that it appears as 
part of the city's otherwise secular celebration of the Christmas 
holiday."ll8 "Those who do not share [Christian] beliefs [will 
find] the symbolic reenactment of a divine being who has been 
miraculously incarnated as a man stands as a dramatic reminder 
of their differences with the Christian Faith.''l19 
Justice Brennan was correct in insisting that the majority 
should have looked at the creche in isolation-apart from both 
the Christmas holidays and the otherwise secular display. As 
noted in the district court opinion: "So long as the viewer pos-
sesses the background knowledge necessary to comprehend what 
the symbol is meant to stand for, the symbol does not lose its 
power as a communicative device simply by being taken out of 
its original, or optimal, context." 120 At the same time, this "reli-
gious effect'' should be measured against contextual factors such 
as the seasonal nature of the display and the relationship of the 
creche to other objects in the display. In in any event, the perva-
sively religious nature of the nativity scene combined with the 
fact that Pawtucket included no other religious symbols in the 
display clearly suggests that the overall effect of the display was 
the impermissible advancement of religion. 
Finally, the Brennan dissent pointed to possible future entan-
glements between government and religion that might be the 
consequence of the majority ruling: "Jews and other non-Chris-
tian groups, prompted [in Pawtucket] by the Mayor's remark 
that he will include a Menorah in future displays, can be ex-
pected to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and 
faced with such requests, government will have to become in-
118. Ibid., at 1377 Gustice Brennan dissenting). 
119. Ibid., Justice Brennan further noted: "For Christians, of course, the essential mes-
sage of the nativity is that God became incarnate in the person of Christ. But just as 
fundamental to Jewish thought is the belief in the 'non-incarnation of God .... [t]he 
God in whom Uews] believe, to whom Uews] are pledged, does not unite with human 
substance on earth.' Martin Buber, Israel and the World (1948) (reprinted in F. Tal-
madge, Disputation and Dialogue: Readings in the Jewish-Christian Encounter 281-282 
(1975)). This distinction, according to Buber, 'constitute[s] the ultimate division between 
Judaism and Christianity.' Ibid., at 281. See also R. Ruether, Faith and Fratricide 246 
(1974). Similarly, those who follow the tenets of Unitarianism might well find Paw-
tucket's support for the symbolism of the creche, which highlights the trinitarian tradi-
tion in Christian faith, to be an affront to their belief in a single divine being. See J. 
Williams, What Americans Believe and How They Worship 316-317 (3d ed. 1969). See 
also C. Olmstead, History of Religion in the United States 296-299 (1960)" (ibid., at 
1377, n. 14). 
120. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1167-68. 
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volved in accommodating the various demands."l21 
The Brennan dissent is a stronger, more comprehensive, 
argument than that proffered by the Burger majority. Unlike 
other symbols, the nativity scene's secular value cannot be read-
ily divorced from its religious significance. Consequently, gov-
ernment should make special efforts to "secularize" such a dis-
play. Exemplary of such special efforts were actions taken by the 
federal government in Allen v. Morton. 
Admittedly, the issue raised in Lynch calls into play both the 
religious heritage of the American people and the antimajoritar-
ian principles of the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the centrality of both values. In the case of an identifia-
ble pervasively religious symbol, however, the balance must be 
struck in favor of the Bill of Rights. As the district court in 
Lynch noted: "We cannot have it both ways-a government that 
scrupulously honors each person's freedom of belief and yet pub-
licly aligns itself with one particular set of beliefs. The endorse-
ment of one is a disparagement of others that were not chosen, 
and it becomes increasingly difficult to accord equal respect to 
what has been publicly marked as less worthy."l22 
In addition to this substantive ruling, the Supreme Court's 
Lynch decision is deficient for its failure to clarify analytical 
standards in Establishment Clause lawsuits. Instead of specifying 
the circumstances in which any of the three ((approved" stand-
ards of review in Establishment Clause cases should be utilized, 
the Court merely acknowledged that there were, in fact, three 
viable standards of review.l23 As mentioned, the Court did not 
even bother to specify why the first circuit was wrong in apply-
ing the Larson test. 
This inconclusiveness was noted by Justice Brennan who under-
standably remarked: "It seems the Court is willing to alter its 
analysis from Term to Term in order to suit its preferred results." 124 
At the same time, the tenor of the Burger opinion is indicative of 
what probably will happen in future Establishment Clause deci-
sions. First, the Court seems more-or-less committed to make use of 
the tripartite test. Although its comment concerning the inapplica-
bility of Larson is opaque, the Court's failure to utilize that standard 
121. Lynch v. Donnelly, at 1355, 1374 Uustice Brennan dissenting). 
122. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1180-81. 
123. Lynchv.Donnelly,at 1355,1362. "[Although]we have often found it useful[toapply the 
tripartite test) ... we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any 
single test of criterion in this sensitive area." 
124. Ibid., at 1372, n. 4, 1373 Uustice Brennan dissenting). 
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in an uneven benefit case like Lynch 125 suggests that the compelling 
interest-least restrictive means test will only be used in uneven 
regulatory interference cases. Similarly, the majority's failure to 
extend the Marsh historical exemption into a more general cultural 
or traditional exception suggests that the Marsh standard is limited 
to practices whose origin can be traced to the First Congress.126 
The language in Lynch is also suggestive of how the Court will 
utilize the tripartite test. The Lynch Court's changes in perspective 
as to the meaning of the Establishment Clause127 and its emphasis 
on acceptable government interfaces with religion 128 suggest that 
the Court will be deferential in its applications of the tripartite test. 
This conclusion is buttressed by two of the three 1982-83 term 
Establishment Clause decisions, Mueller v. Allen and Marsh v. 
Chambers. 129 The other 1982-83 term decision, Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den, can be distinguished from these other rulings since govern-
ment vested rule-making authority in religious institutions.130 
Apparently, Lynch supports the trend set by the previous term's 
rulings, namely, that government may benefit religion in an even or 
uneven manner provided that such government benefits do not limit 
the government's rule-making authority. 
To many, the days of strict separation between church and state 
may now seem past. This may provide both benefits and disadvan-
tages. On the positive side, there is much truth to the contentions 
that in a complex society, government and religious organizations 
will have contact with each other in myriad ways. Additionally, the 
government should be able to permit Medicaid and Medicare bene-
fits to patients at church-affiliated hospitals, to advance the goal of 
equal education opportunity by permitting disadvantaged students 
attending private schools to share in federal aid to education pro-
grams, and to provide funds to church-related universities to con-
duct medical and scientific research. Put simply: Society should not 
become so secularized as to exclude any reference to religion. 
Finally, America's religious heritage need not be totally ignored by 
the secular government. Lynch clearly recognizes that church and 
state cannot and should not be absolutely separated. 
125. Lynch is arguably an uneven benefits case. Justice Brennan, for example, noted in his 
dissent that "Pawtucket itself owns the creche and instead of extending similar attention to a 
'broad spectrum' of religious and secular groups, it has singled out Christianity for special 
treatment" (ibid., at 1374 Uustice Brennan dissenting]). See also notes 13-15. 
126. See ibid., at 1370, n. 1 Oustice Brennan dissenting}. 
127. See notes 104-7. 
128. See notes ll5-52. 
129. See notes 8-12, 17-21. 
130. See notes 22-25. 
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At the same time, government moneys or government support of 
one particular kind of religious belief might be the principal evil that 
the Establishment Clause sought to forestall. School prayer and 
public-funded displays of the cross or the nativity scene are examples 
of such nonpermissible government support of a particular kind of 
religious belief. Lynch, thus, poses the danger of permitting the sort 
of church-state entanglements that will alienate individuals sub-
scribing to minority religious views. 
All in all, it is hard to assess whether society is better off with an 
overly strict or overly deferential interpretation of what constitutes 
an establishment of religion. It is unfortunate, however, that the 
Supreme Court has never been able to recognize simultaneously the 
centrality of both separation and accommodation. 
